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PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING

An Overview of Parallel
Distributed Processing
Jonathan P. Heyl
East Carolina University
Abstract
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP), or
Connectionism, is a frontier cognitive
theory that is currently garnering
considerable attention from a variety of
fields. Briefly summarized herein are the
theoretical foundations of the theory, the
key elements observed in creating
simulation computer programs, examples
of its applications, and some comparisons
with other models of cognition. A
majority of the information is culled from
Rumelhart and McClelland's (1986) twovolume introduction to the theory, while
some concerns from the field and the
theorists' accompanying responses are
taken from a 1990 article by Hanson and
Burr.
The theory of Parallel Distributed
Processing (PDP), or "Connectionism," is
currently enjoying some degree of
attention, in part due to its fairly radical
departure from the mainstream ideas
about cognition that have dominated the
field for the past several decades. The
reactions to it range from unconditional
acceptance to denial, but the attitude of
the majority seems to reflect a "curious
and interested but not entirely convinced"
viewpoint. The fact that such an
apparently large number of people in the
field are displaying an interest tends to
lend the theory a degree of legitimacy, or
at least worthiness of further exploration
and study, and is the view primarily
reflected in this paper.
The majority of the information
used to describe the theory in this paper is
culled from Rumelhart and McClelland's
two-volume explanation of PDP published
in 1986, with the intent being to
summarize and possibly simplify the
major structural points. The latter part of
this paper reviews some objections and
concerns about the theory that followed a

more recent article on PDP by Hanson and
Burr (1990).
PDP is a difficult theory to
summarize for several reasons. First, it is
extremely complex mathematically, with
numerous symbolic formulas to represent
various functions. Secondly, its domain is
broad, operating not only under the
conventions of the field of psychology
(diverse in itself), but expanding to
encompass the fields of computer science,
philosophy, and artificial intelligence.
Thirdly, the theory is undergoing rapid
refinement under a surge of
experimentation and its subsequent new
data, leaving some components of its
original form approaching obsolescence.
"Parallel" processing denotes the
simultaneous activity occurring in the
brain at any one time, as opposed to
processing of a serial nature. The idea is
that such a vast amount of information is
being processed so quickly in the
performance of even the simplest tasks
that time constraints rule out the
possibility of exclusively serial operation.
This is not necessarily meant to deny the
existence of any serial processes, for it
seems obvious that there are some (e.g.,
problem solving). Yet each step of these
higher-order serial processes is made
possible by, and is the result of, largescale parallel processing.
Supporting the idea of parallel
processing is the speed of the neuron,
which is relatively slow (compared to a
purely electronic device, and more
specifically, a computer). Rumelhart and
McClelland (1986) point out that "neurons
operate in the time scale of milliseconds
whereas computer components operate in
the time scale of nanoseconds—a factor of
10 6 faster." Thus, observed human
operations taking approximately one
second to compute would be limited to
performing only about one hundred
sequential steps—an improbably low
number given the complexity of functions
like perception, speech analysis, etc. Also
implying parallelism is the vast number of
neurons we possess, estimated to be
between 1010 and 1011 , each being an
"active processing unit" and capable of
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receiving input from many other neurons
by means of simple excitatory or
inhibitory impulses. These
interconnections between neurons are
usually short, as well as symmetrical,
implying at least the possibility of back
propagation (feed-backward as well as
feed-forward impulses) and interactive
activation (Rumelhart & McClelland,
1986).
The word "distributed" in the
theory's title refers to the authors'
contention that representations are not
complete entities stored as a whole at
some location in the brain. Rather,
representations are distributed across
some number of units (neurons) and are
held in the "connective weights," or
strengths, between them. When certain
neurons are activated, their activation is
fed through these weights to produce a
pattern of activation representative of the
"stored" item. When the memory is not
activated, it resides only in connection
strengths between neurons.
Part of the evidence supporting
distributed storage is based on
observations of how performance declines
following brain damage. In many ways it
reflects Lashley's (1929) Mass Action
findings, wherein removal of brain tissue
leads to "graceful degradation" of
performance, rather than the complete loss
of some motor function or the loss of an
entire "concept." This is not intended to
mean that there are no localized areas
within the brain, but it does maintain that
knowledge within these localized areas is
distributed. Just as there are both serial
and parallel aspects to processing, there
exist both local and distributed aspects of
storage. PDP maintains simply that the
operations of the brain are primarily
parallel and distributed in nature.
Much of what makes PDP
appealing is its theoretical similarity to
"neural hardware." One goal of PDP is to
construct models that not only function
with optimal efficiency and accuracy, but
that also retain human physiological
plausibility. It has prompted a rethinking
of artificial intelligence and its methods,
and its insights have redirected some ideas
about human cognition that were based on
18

computer models. One of these ideas
regards the omission of any "central
executive" or "program chip" to form and
retrieve memories. To PDP, everything
from learning to recall to concept
formation is related to the basic, elemental
units and their interactions. While this is
sometimes criticized for being below the
level at which a cognitive theory should
operate, it is arguably a highly appropriate
and logical place to start. Studying and
understanding the lowest elements may
lead to future discovery of "higher"
functions, which would then enjoy the
benefit of a strong foundation.
Analogously, Rumelhart and McClelland
(1986) concede that it would be difficult
to understand a diamond just by studying
a single carbon atom. However, it would
be rather foolish to ignore what we know
of this carbon atom and how it aligns with
others when studying the diamond as a
whole. Concluding simply that a diamond
is "hard" is of questionable significance in
understanding it.
With these ideas in mind, let us
proceed to a description of the model's
architecture. While various computersimulated models differ, there are certain
aspects of any PDP model that remain
basically constant, outlined by Rumelhart
and McClelland (1986) in their
explanation of a model's general
framework.
The basic element is, of course, the
processing unit itself, equivalent
theoretically to a highly-simplified model
of a neuron. Each individual unit's role in
the system is very limited; it is a small
component of a larger system, and is
basically meaningless in and of itself. The
pattern resulting from the activity between
many units is what defines a meaningful
entity. A unit's only function is to receive
input, compute an output value from it,
and send that output value to other units.
Some-systems use only two types
of units, but many use three. Input units
receive external input, either from the
"world" or from other units outside the
observed system. Output units direct
signals from the system outside, either to
other systems or directly to motoric
activity. The third type of units, called
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Usually a threshold value is involved; that
hidden units, neither influence nor are
is, unless a unit is activated to a certain
influenced by forces outside the system,
value, it will have no effect at all on
but reside between the input and output
neighboring units. This means that if a
units and function as modifiers of activity
unit is activated in such a way as to
between the two. The earliest
compute
a .6 output value, but its
"connectionist-type" models, such as the
threshold
is
1, the units connected to it
ancestral "perceptron" of Rosenblatt
receive
no
input
from it at all.
(1958), relied only on the input and output
The
pattern
of connectivity
units and were therefore somewhat limited
between the units represents the
in their capabilities. The employment of
knowledge contained in the system.
hidden units is what has allowed the more
Simply, everything a system "knows" is
recent systems to function at a much
represented by which units are
higher level of performance.
interconnected, the modifiable strengths
The state of activation of a system
of those connections, and, as a
reflects what a certain system is
consequence, the pattern they will produce
representing at a certain time, based on the
when activated. In the simplest case, it is
activation value of its units (recall that a
assumed that the input to a unit is the
representation is defined by a pattern of
weighted sum of all inputs it receives
activation across multiple units). This
from units that are connected to it. The
may be represented in vector notation by a
positive or negative value of this sum
vector a, with each value in that vector
determines whether the input is excitatory
specifying the activation of one unit. For
or inhibitory, and its absolute value
example, the activation of a four-unit
denotes the strength, or weight, of the
vector a at time t, written as a(t), might be
connection. More complex cases may call
[1,0,-1,0] . This distinct pattern of
for different types of inputs to be summed
activation denotes the current
before impinging on the designated unit.
representation.
It could represent
For example, all excitatory inputs may be
anything—a dog, a cat, a baseball, etc.;
run
through one connectivity matrix to
each unit is activated to a certain value
produce a value, while all inhibitory
based on the stimulus input of the object,
inputs are run through a separate
and each object in this way motivates a
connectivity matrix, with their final values
different "pattern of activation vector" for
then summed upon reaching the
representing it.
designated recipient unit.
Activation values may vary
The rule of propagation takes the
according to the specific model being
considered. Some models specify discrete
"output values of the units and combines it
with the connectivity matrices to produce
levels (which are usually binary), with "1"
meaning the unit is activated and "0"
a net input for each type of input into the
meaning that it is not. A discrete model
unit" (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986).
could also range from -1 to 1, as in the
This refers to the issue stated above,
example above. Other models may
regarding the modification of input signals
specify the use of continuous activation
in a matrix before impinging on a unit.
values which might yield, for example, a
The activation rule, expressed as
vector such as [ .6, .4, 0, -.8].
the function F, combines all the net inputs
In addition to receiving inputs,
acting on a unit with that unit's current
units also pass output on to other units.
activation level in order to produce a new
How they affect neighboring units is a --level of activation for that unit. That is,
result of their own current level of
the level to which a unit is activated is a
activation being mapped through an
function of the activation level it currently
output function (f) to produce an output
maintains and the net input of all units
signal oi(t) (the output of unit i at time t).
impinging on it.
Basically, a unit receives input, converts it
To accommodate learning, the
to an output signal, and passes it along to
patterns of connectivity must be
connected units that receive it as input.
modifiable as a result of experience.
MODERN PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES
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Adjustment to the interconnective weights
is necessary, since it is these weights that
"store" all knowledge. The most easily
understood approach to accomplishing
this utilizes an extended and expanded
version of the Hebbian learning rule,
which basically states that any time any
two connected units are highly activated,
the connective weight between them
should be strengthened. The most
commonly-used extension of this is the
Widrow-Hoff, or delta rule, so named
because "the amount of learning is
proportional to the difference (or delta)
between the actual activation achieved
and the target activation provided by a
teacher" (Rumelhart & McClelland,
1986). In other words, how much is
learned (how much the weight is
modified) is proportional to the distance
between where it is and where it needs to
be. The further "off-target" it is, the more
it will learn. (Incidentally, the "teacher"
function could be considered somewhat
controversial, in that it is external in
nature; however, many examples of
human learning do have an external
teacher that guides the formation of
correct associations. This teacher, though,
does not change connective weights; that
is done internally in the human mind.)
Symbolically, the delta rule is written
AWij = n (ti(t) - ai(t)) oj(t) and states that
the weight connection between unit i and
unit j changes as a function of the
proportional rate of learning, the teaching
input on unit i minus that unit's current
activation, and the output value of unit j.
Lastly, any PDP model must have
a specified environment that it is to
operate in. What this means is that "there
is some probability that any of the
possible set of input patterns is impinging
on the input units" (Rumelhart &
McClelland, 1986). This is significant
when models are restricted as to what
types of vectors they can accept as input, or what kind of stimuli they are equipped
to process.
While the above aspects are in
simplified form and not precisely
applicable to all the various models that
have been constructed (some use more
complex, non-Hebbian learning rules, for
20

example), they do provide an overview of
the basic workings of a PDP system.
Builders of PDP models employ
the general framework just covered, but
also operate under further constraints to
maintain neural plausibility in their
models. One of these is the "100-step
program" constraint (Feldman, 1985),
regarding the aforementioned limit on the
number of sequential steps a brain is
capable of processing in a second. The
constructed models perform comparably,
time-wise, with humans; that is, if the
model can produce an output in less than a
second, it must use parallelism in order
not to violate the "100 sequential steps per
second" limit that is imposed on the
human mind by the slowness of neuronal
activity. The nanosecond processing
capability of the computers is not allowed,
for this would result in an inaccurate
simulation of human performance.
A second point is brought up by
PDP proponents to distance their models
from the usual (or older) computer
analogies to thinking. As mentioned
earlier, all models consider knowledge to
be stored in the connection strengths,
rather than as a "state." While a pattern
can be activated to a state temporarily,
that state is not the knowledge. That
knowledge is said to be implicit in the
system, residing only in the weights. In
effect, PDP wants to "replace the
'computer metaphor' as a model of mind
with the 'brain metaphor' as a model of
mind" (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986).
So what are PDP models capable
of? Some fairly impressive things,
actually. Two models are presented in the
following paragraphs in an attempt to
illustrate the methods of functioning and
the capabilities. Probably the simplest
model to describe and understand is the
pattern associator, so it will be presented
first. The second model considered shows
PDP's applicability to the field of artificial
intelligence.
What a pattern associator does, as
its name implies, is associate two different
patterns of activation that are related in
some manner. Rumelhart and McClelland
(1986) use as an example a system that
learns to associate the pattern of activation
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representing the appearance of an object
with that of its aroma, so that when given
the visual input (e.g. [+1,-1,-1,+1]), it will
produce the olfactory pattern (a similar
vector).
It accomplishes this through the
use of a matrix (four rows by four
columns in this case), with the visual input
vector placed horizontally across the top
and the olfactory vector positioned
vertically along the side. The goal is to
have the values on the visual vector excite
the corresponding value on the olfactory
vector if it is a positive value, and inhibit
it if it is a negative value. This is done by
modifying the strengths of the connections
within the matrix, so that when multiplied
by the values of the visual vector, each
row will sum to the desired value on the
olfactory vector. For example, if the
visual vector is specified as [+1,-1,-1,+1[,
and needs to produce a (-1) value at the
top position of the olfactory vector
(corresponding to the top row of the
matrix), then the connective weight values
to
would
be
"tuned"
[-.25,+.25,+.25,-.25]. Thus, as each value
of the visual vector is multiplied by the
connection strength it results in a (-.25)
value; and when these four values are
summed across the row they yield the
appropriate (-1) value on the olfactory
vector. The remaining three rows in the
matrix are set up in the same way, to yield
appropriate values in the remaining
positions of the vertical olfactory vector.
While this model may not seem simple at
first glance, its simplicity becomes more
evident after a short time of study and
consideration (and seems even more so in
light of other PDP models).
This simple model illustrates some
interesting attributes of distributed
representations. First, it learns through
simple repetition; that is, learning is
accomplished simply by repeated
simultaneous presentations - of the two
patterns. Furthermore, the model can
"teach itself' the proper set of connection
weights (within the matrix), just as a result
of this experience. It employs the basic
Hebbian rule, extended to cover positive
and negative activation values: the
strength of the connection between the

visual and olfactory vectors is adjusted "in
proportion to the product of their
simultaneous activation . . . if the product
is positive, the change makes the
connection more excitatory, and if the
product is negative, the change makes the
connection more inhibitory" (Rumelhart
& McClelland, 1986). The strengths of
the connections are formed gradually, in
Hebbian fashion, and the information
needed to determine their values is
available locally from the activation of
neighboring units. No "central executive"
is needed. Essentially, an "empty" or
"blank" pattern associator could learn to
associate the two patterns simply through
exposure to repeated simultaneous
presentations.
An interesting point arises with
regard to this pattern associator, and lends
it a degree of similarity with human
functioning. A perfect visual pattern is
not necessary to produce an accurate
olfactory pattern (though an imperfect
visual pattern would result in a weakerthan-optimal olfactory pattern). For
example, altering one value on the visual
vector (e.g., flipping it to zero) would still
result in the corresponding value on the
olfactory vector being pushed in the
proper direction (positive or negative).
This is known as "graceful degradation,"
and is seen in other PDP models. It
maintains, basically, that internal access to
a representation is not lost completely as a
result of distorted input, a characteristic
that stands in stark contrast to a
computer—for without a precise "address"
from which to obtain desired information,
a computer will produce nothing at all.
The matrix formed to associate the
above two patterns can also be used to
associate a separate pair of patterns, or
some number of other patterns. Assume
that a second pattern associator matrix is
produced using the visual and olfactory
-patterns of another object. When this
matrix is overlaid on the original one and
the separate connective weights are
summed at their corresponding positions,
the result is a matrix that will produce the
correct olfactory output given either set of
visual input. Using a simple Hebbian rule
as stated above, this matrix is limited to
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accurately processing only inputs that are
fairly distinct from one another, but
matrices incorporating more elaborate
learning rules are capable of handling
many similar inputs. This latter type leads
to the emergence of several attractive
properties.
One of these is that a new visual
pattern that is similar to an old one will
generate a similar olfactory pattern,
leading to a useful form of "spontaneous
generalization." The model is also
capable of extracting a "central tendency"
from the repeated presentation of the same
pattern with various degrees of distortion.
Furthermore, the model will "recognize"
and utilize regularities between different
pairs of patterns, allowing the formation
of interconnective strengths that produce
patterns that appear to be the result of rule
usage, but are really attained only through
repetition of input patterns.
One
particular model, as an example, was fed
pairs of words, the first being a root verb
and the second being its past-tense form
'(Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). After
multiple pairs were presented, it was
tested using previously unused (nontraining set) words, and produced childlike errors that appeared to result from the
application of rules (e.g., it converted
"come" to "camed"). No "add -ed" rule
was ever given to the system, yet its
connections were formed with the
tendency to apply that particular pattern.
More complex models, particularly
those that utilize hidden units to modify
the signals between the input and output
units, are capable of substantially more
impressive results.
One model
(Churchland, 1989) is presented here as an
example, and was designed with the goal
of differentiating the very similar sonar
echoes of mines and rocks on the ocean
floor. This is an extremely difficult task,
in that the two echoes sound identical to
the untrained human ear, - and the echoes
within each type may vary considerably.
The network was constructed with
thirteen input units, each one's activation
level being dependent on a certain sound
frequency extracted from the echo. A
layer of seven hidden units, each receiving
input from all thirteen input units, then
22

processed the incoming signals and sent
modified output signals to the two output
units. Only two output units were needed,
for the ideal output values of [1,0] for
mines and [0,1] for rocks.
The model learned by being given
multiple examples of mine and rock
echoes (vectorized by sound frequency)
one at a time, and having its output
evaluated after each. Following each
presentation, its actual output was
compared with its target output, and the
connective weights within the system that
were deemed most likely to be causing the
error were adjusted according to
Rumelhart, Williams, and Hinton's
algorithmic "generalized delta rule"
(Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). After
several thousand presentations and weight
modifications, the system was surprisingly
accurate in its ability to distinguish the
two types of echoes in its training set
(approximately 90% correct). It had
"tuned" its connections to detect whatever
combination or pattern of features was
unique to each type of echo. The
"knowledge" was in its connections
weights and was obtained through a
learning algorithm that allowed those
weights to be acquired.
What was going on inside the
model to allow the connection weights
alone to distinguish a rock echo from a
mine echo? One must stretch,
intellectually, and grasp the notion of a
seven-dimensional "hyper" figure within,
an abstract space with one dimension
supplied by each of the hidden units.
Each echo vector that was fed into the
system, and consequently to the hidden
units, fell into one point in this "hidden
unit activation vector" space. The
system's objective was to divide this space
into two subspaces, one to represent rocks
and one to represent mines. The output
units' only job was then to determine
which subspace a given echo fell within.
Yet this system's capabilities go
impressively further. Echo vectors that
occupied the center of each subspace were
the prototypes and would produce output
values near the goals of either [1,0] or
[0,1]. Those vectors that fell near the
boundary separating the two subspaces
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would retain the proper relationship
between the two values, but would be less
precise--for example, [.6, .4]. This
illustrates the system's "graded
responses," and is evidence of its
sensitivity to similarities across the
dimensions. The system is impressive in
and of itself, but becomes more so when
its characteristics are applied to something
like human speech perception, where we
accurately process a highly variant set of
phonemic input into "subspaces" of
correct categorization. Interestingly, this
human capability was simulated to some
degree in the PDP model of NETtalk
(Rosenberg & Sejnowski, 1987).
Moving into the construction of
memory models, PDP focuses once again
on the micro-elements, exploring and
theorizing on the roles of neurons and
their connections. By the theorists' own
admission, their memory model does not
at this point attempt to elucidate the
detailed processes involved in the retrieval
and use of memory to guide behavior.
What they are attempting to do is
construct a physiologically plausible
model that conforms to empirical data that
strongly imply the storage of both general
and specific information, in the form of
abstracted prototypes and specific
exemplars. This is done within the
general framework of individual units,
activation values, and weighted
connections.
In the memory model, the units are
structured into larger entities called
modules, each of which consists of a large
number of interconnected units. The
modules themselves are also
interconnected, and each may receive
input either from the other modules or
from external stimuli.
A mental state is defined as "a
pattern of activation over the units in
some subset of the modules" (Rumelhart
& McClelland, 1986). • Basically, the
pattern currently activated represents what
resides in conscious thought at that
moment. Each memory, or pattern of
activation, leaves a trace, or slight change
in the interconnective weights. Being of a
distributed nature, all memory traces in
the system leave their influence in a

common set of weights. The process of
retrieval is simply the calling-up of a prior
mental state with the aid of an externallysupplied cue, which would itself be some
part or "fragment" of the original state.
This external cue could possibly come
either from the "world" or from an internal
search process, although a specific
mechanism for the latter has not yet been
fully developed for incorporation into the
model.
The units in the model can take on
any value between -1 and 1. A zero value
is considered neutral, and weights will
tend to decay toward it with time. In an
attempt to maintain consistency with
human functioning, this decay is assumed
to be rapid at first and then gradually
slowing. This translates roughly into the
"freshness" of a recent human memory,
and how it becomes less easily accessible
with the passage of time.
Each memory trace that passes
through the module causes a slight change
in the complete set of weights. The delta
rule is utilized for establishing the correct
direction and magnitude of each weight
change, and its function is to enhance the
"storage of connection information." That
is, given a partial pattern as a retrieval
cue, the connections between the units are
weighted in such a way as to reinstate the
complete pattern by providing appropriate
excitatory/inhibitory input to the
connected units. The goal is to have
internal activation match external
activation. For example, if a certain unit
is excited by some input pattern, the
connections leading to it from other units
will tend to excite it as well.
The specific model explained in
the following paragraphs (Rumelhart &
McClelland, 1986) was designed to
illustrate what occurs in the storage of
memories, and how memories naturally
categorize themselves and form a
prototype for that category. It shows how
multiple concepts can be held in the same
set of weights, and the ability of specific
examples to exist in the weights in
addition to the prototype.
The model was constructed using
twenty-four units—sixteen for
representing the visual patterns of
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activation for different "dogs," and the
remaining eight for representing various
different names, or types, of dogs. A
prototype "dog" vector was constructed,
being just a randomly-chosen string of -1
and +1 values. This prototype was never
presented to the model, but fifty random
distortions of it were, each obtained from
the random flipping of different values on
the vector. After each presentation of a
distortion, the delta rule modified the
weights appropriately, and these
increments to the weights were then
allowed to decay down to about five
percent of their initial effect before the
next presentation.
What results is a set of weights
that changes slightly with the presentation
of each new distortion, but after fifty
presentations of distortions it forms a
matrix remarkably close to the "prototype
dog" pattern. Most deviations from the
prototype are caused by the most recent
distortions presented to it. This is due to
the lesser amount of time to decay and the
fact that no further presentations have
been presented to "blend" their influence.
This is consistent with observed
characteristics in human memory. The
model will more easily "recognize" the
prototype than any specific examples
(distortions), but it cannot apply a name to
the prototype pattern, since each distortion
was given with a different name vector
(corresponding to the different types of
dogs). If, however, all the examples given
had been named simply "dog", then the
model would produce the prototype visual
pattern in response to the prompt of that
name (and vice versa--if given the
prototype visual pattern, it would respond
with the name pattern for "dog").
Yet the model's abilities go beyond
this. The model was next shown to be
capable of storing three different concepts
in the same set of twenty-four units. Two
of the patterns were - similar
(nonorthogonal), representing "dog" and
"cat," while the third pattern was
orthogonal and represented "bagels."
When given distortions of the
three different prototypes (under the same
procedure as above), and given the
appropriate category name
24

simultaneously, the model assigned each
pattern to its proper concept. That is, after
a sufficient number of training trials, the
model was able to produce the appropriate
prototype pattern when given a category
name. As with humans, making the
distinction between dogs and cats took
longer than distinguishing those two from
bagels, but the delta rule ultimately settled
on a set of weights that reliably produced
the desired results.
The model
accomplished this by the fiftieth trial; all
three concepts and their prototypes were
held within the same set of weights.
Furthermore, the model was proven able
to form these three visual-pattern
categories without the aid of being given
names; in this case, the eight-valued name
vectors presented with the visual patterns
were all flipped to zero. Still the model
achieved proper categorization of the
three different patterns, with no
mechanism supplied for doing so.
The model can also store the
patterns of specific exemplars in addition
to the prototype, as is obviously necessary
in human memory. In this situation, the
model was again given fifty training trials.
One particular distortion of the prototype
was given the name "Rover" as an eightunit name pattern vector, another was
given "Fido," and the remaining
distortions were simply called "dog."
After training, the model could produce
the appropriate visual pattern given the
name of either exemplar (Rover or Fido);
if given the name "dog," it would produce
the prototype visual pattern. Its ability to
do this lies in the weight connections.
The name pattern for "Rover" is
connected with the visual pattern in such a
way as to reinstate the pattern.
Incidentally, there was only one element
that differed between the "Rover" visual
pattern and the prototype pattern.
Because of this, the unit representing that
element had an extremely strong
connection to the pattern representing the
"Rover" name.
What we see regarding the
"Rover" illustration is "content
addressability," which means that a
memory is accessible given a partial
element of its pattern as a prompt. This
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prompt, or retrieval cue, is not used as an
aid in "finding" the whole memory in
permanent storage and bringing up a copy
of it to working memory; rather, it is a
part of the memory itself, and its
activation will complete the activation of
the entire pattern via interconnections
between units.
The basic ideas underlying this
model can be applied to the explanation of
other aspects of memory as well. Models
have been constructed that can accurately
duplicate the effects of semantic priming
seen in human behavior (Rumelhart &
McClelland, 1986). Semantic priming—
the ability to recall a familiar item more
easily and quickly if it has been recently
experienced—has fallen into some
difficulty lately in its interpretation.
Traditionally, the priming effect seen in
word recognition was explained by
assuming the presence of a "word
detector" or "logogen" in the mind, with a
threshold level for activation. Each time
the word detector was activated, the
threshold would be lowered
(temporarily—eventually the activation
effect decays). But Rumelhart and
McClelland (1986) note that empirical
testing (Jacoby, 1983) has shown that
changes in context (e.g., different voices
or media employed in the priming and test
conditions) result in weaker priming
effects, which would not be predicted if
dealing with a single word detector.
Presumably, any manner in which said
word detector is accessed should serve
equally well.
The PDP model used to account
for this strays little in concept from the
above theory, but attempts to describe
priming effects physiologically and to
account for the problem of changing
contexts. Imagine a stimulus detector
spread over a set of weights, such as the
structure of the "dog" module presented
above. Each activation of that particular
stimulus (assume for convenience that the
stimulus is a word) contributes to a
composite memory trace, much like all the
different presentations of "dogs"
contributed to an averaged prototype; but
"the characteristics of particular
experiences tend nevertheless to be

preserved, at least until they are
overridden by canceling characteristics of
other traces" (Rumelhart & McClelland,
1986).
The ability to more easily perceive
a recently-presented stimulus is a result of
the composite memory trace being
recently active, allowing a new
presentation of the stimulus to settle into a
stable pattern of activation across the units
more quickly. The effect of changing
contexts is explainable by the supposition
that recent memory traces have not
decayed as much, leaving a relatively
strong influence on the pattern across the
units. If a stimulus is presented in a
testing condition that is identical to the
priming situation, these strong traces
enable a match to be made promptly. If
the stimulus is presented under different
testing conditions, the system does not
have the benefit of an exact match and
must access the somewhat "distorted"
averaged pattern that resides in the
composite memory trace as a whole.
What this type of structure in a model
does is continually update a "summary
representation," with the most recent
exemplars influencing the pattern slightly
in their direction. With time, or with
subsequently presented exemplars, the
characteristics of the exemplars blend into
a composite memory trace. The more
similar each exemplar is to the summary
representation, the more they will blend,
and lose their individual characteristics
relating to the context in which they were
experienced. Exemplars that vary widely
from the central tendency will tend to be
held as memory traces in the context in
which they were experienced.
The above point can be used to
explain the gradual conversion of episodic
memory traces to semantic memories (if
one subscribes to a distinction between the
two). Assume a "proposition" is
experienced at several different times and
in several different contexts. If each
experience is generally consistent with the
others, a central tendency or summary
representation will emerge from the
similarities between them, while their
unique contexts will gradually "wash out"
as a consequence of their evident
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irrelevance. What is left is a summary
representation of a proposition that is
considered semantic in nature, but that
was formed naturally by episodic
experiences.
Furthermore, this line of thinking
can be employed to explain the results of
the well-known Loftus experiments (e.g.,
Loftus & Palmer, 1974), in which
subjects' memories were apparently
"changed" as a result of the wording that
was used when asking for recall. PDP
would contend that one memory was not
"overwritten" by the other, but that the
wording of the recall question formed
another memory "trace" that blended with
the first one. Since, according to PDP,
memories do not exist as a whole but as a
set of weights that are modified with each
new trace, the observed results in the
Loftus experiments reflect a modified
composite memory. Could the "original"
memory be drawn out, as has been
suggested, through the use of hypnosis or
other techniques? Probably, if the original
trace has not decayed sufficiently into the
blend, and can be reinstated with strong
enough contextual fragments of its
original pattern as cues.
What PDP is attempting to show
with its memory models is that simple
units, in conjunction with the delta rule for
modifying weights between them with
information that is locally available, can
account for observed characteristics of
memory without any type of executive
overseer. They will automatically and
naturally draw out a central tendency from
input without any mechanisms for
generalization and without any rule
applied by a "program chip." PDP does
not assert that rules do not exist in any
area of cognition, but merely intends to
show that some processes that appear to
use rules or a "program" are not
necessarily doing so.
How does PDP's conception of
memory compare with other theories? It
obviously differs considerably from the
original stage models based on computers,
such as Atkinson and Shiffrin's (1968).
While this type of model does not enjoy
the acceptance today that it did upon its
introduction nearly three decades ago, its
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abstract framework and its distinction
between "working" and "permanent"
memory are still readily referred to and
utilized in explaining cognitive processes.
PDP does not subscribe to this
division of memory, its primary objection
being to envisioning working memory as a
"central processor" or an executive,
capable of searching a "file cabinet" of
separate and complete memories in
permanent storage. As stated earlier, PDP
does not view memories as "whole"
entities, but simply weights in the
connections between units. For PDP, the
"file cabinets" would have to be somehow
interconnected with drawers that slid into
and through others. The documents in
"one drawer" may be the "A's" when
accessed once, and the "P's" when
accessed the next time. Moreover, new
documents added to a drawer would tend
to blend with the other ones, changing the
characteristics slightly of all the
documents previously in that drawer,
which themselves had already influenced
each other. Stretching this ill-fated
analogy further, the file cabinets would
even be "empty" until a the need for a
document was prompted, at which point
some number of them would suddenly
produce it with no search necessary. PDP,
despite its contentions otherwise, appears
to be fairly passive in many areas and
does not at this point allow an "active
processor" to guide a memory search.
Before the more recent (and more
empirically plausible) models are
examined a point should be made. The
authors of PDP in its original form
maintain that their theory is not
necessarily to be viewed as an alternative
to other models. That is, it does not
proclaim the other models to be
necessarily incorrect in their assumptions
of the structures and workings of memory.
Rather, PDP is interested in providing a
neuronally-plausible explanation for what
may be occurring within these models.
PDP is in essence attempting to dissect
these abstract, symbolic processes and
structures and provide a physical basis for
them. When and if these physical
processes are sufficiently exposed to the
satisfaction of a majority, they may lead to
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altered versions of these existing models
(or completely new ones), but will not
necessarily require them. In fact, they
may end up supporting and strengthening
these previous theories instead. With this
in mind, a few other models can now be
examined, noting what PDP has to say
about their assertions.
Craik and Lockhart's (1972) levels
of processing approach states that the
more deeply material is processed, the
more durable its resultant memory trace
will be and the more easily it will be
retrieved. "Depth" basically correlates
with semantic processing, as compared to
"shallow" processing of a stimulus'
physical characteristics. It shares the
assumption with PDP that memory is not
composed of separate storages.
Experimental support for the level
of processing as a determinant of recall
ability (Craik & Watkins, 1973; Parkin,
1984), wherein subjects better recalled
material that they had semantically
processed, could be explained by the
contentions of PDP. The point could be
made that semantic processing—as
opposed to the judging of the physical
characteristics of a stimulus word—adds
more dimensions (employs more units)
and results in a more richly interconnected
pattern. In effect, semantically processing
a stimulus word would usually involve
relating it to its context or associating it
with related things. Each would form
connections from the stimulus to the
related items, meaning that there would be
a much broader base from which to draw a
partial pattern, which would then serve as
an impetus for reinstating the whole. The
larger a prompted fragment is, the better
able it is to excite and inhibit its
interconnected units and achieve pattern
completion. Interestingly, this
explanation can account for the data that
contradict levels of processing as well.
One experiment that produced such data
found subjects recalling the stimulus word
"dime" equally well when given the
physical-feature cue "ime" as when given
the semantic cue "an American coin"
(Nelson & McEvoy, 1979). Again, it is a
matter of pattern completion. The subject
has seen the word "dime" and it has

registered as a visual pattern of activation
across interconnected units. When given
"ime" as a cue, seventy-five percent of its
word detector units are activated and can
each send appropriate activation to the
unit responsible for representing the "d" in
the first position. Thus the pattern is
completed easily by virtue of internal
connections formed during exposure to
the stimulus.
The teachable language
comprehender (TLC) of Collins and
Quillian, possibly the first well-known
model to employ a hierarchical structure
of memory items, suffered from test
results that were inconsistent with its
predictions. One of its major problems
stemmed from subjects' tendencies to
violate the hierarchy, as in more quickly
confirming a dog's status as an animal
than its status as a mammal (Rips,
Shoben, & Smith, 1973). PDP, of course,
denies any hierarchy in the structure of
memory. Its evaluation of this effect
would center on connection strengths and
would be explained by more heavilyweighted connections between "doganimal" than between "dog-mammal."
This is due to the principle outlined in the
basic Hebbian rule, that connective
weights are strengthened with more
associations or simultaneous activations.
Most people hear "dog" associated with
"animal" much more frequently than with
"mammal"; it would be rare to hear
someone ask if there were any mammals
in your backyard. Judging from the
literature, frequency of association was
generally suspected to be the culprit in
this, and the Hebb rule provides a
comfortable degree of support for this
conclusion.
Another problem the TLC model
had regarded "better examples" of
categories (Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974).
For example, subjects might verify a
peach more quickly than a watermelon as
a fruit. It is possible to account for this
finding with the assertions of PDP as well.
When the word "fruit" is heard, assume it
triggers the prototype pattern of activation
for that concept (imagine it as a vector of
some length with various positive and
negative activation values). The activated
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pattern for "peach" closely resembles the
pattern of this prototype, because its
features closely resemble the "averaged"
pattern of all fruits. A watermelon's
pattern, however, does not as closely
resemble the averaged prototype, and
would thus take longer to verify. The
existence of a prototype was never in
doubt in explaining the effect of the
"better example," but PDP provides a
attractive account of the underlying
processes involved.
Collins' next attempt, the
spreading activation model (Collins &
Loftus, 1975), dropped the hierarchical
structure and replaced it with nodes whose
associative strengths with other nodes
were reflected in the lengths of the links
between them. This type of model begins
to approach the thinking of PDP. PDP
would use connective weights to signify
associability rather than semantic distance
along a link and would further attempt to
expose the structure within the nodes (as a
pattern of activation) rather than accepting
them as abstract "wholes." Spreading
activation assumed serial processes as
opposed to PDP's parallel, but the
remainder of its assumptions (regarding
the strength of activation, and the more or
less involuntary activation of closely
associated nodes) could be adapted and
modified to fit within the PDP approach
without too much difficulty. A weakness
of the spreading activation model lay in
the "prestored knowledge" supposed to
exist in the structure which readily
supplied "no" answers via "is not a" links.
PDP would never assume a priori
knowledge, and would thus avoid such a
weakness (although negative answers pose
an equally formidable challenge for PDP
models).
Anderson's Adaptive Control of
Thought (ACT) theory (1976) is possibly
the most sophisticated in the realm of
semantic networks. It also, with a few
exceptions, approaches the principles
embodied in PDP. The storage of
propositions is likely an apt way of
representing knowledge, though Anderson
fails to speculate on the physiological
aspects of how these propositions are
constructed. The propositions could be
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likened to memory modules in a PDP
system, and their interconnective links
representing the strengths of the
associations between them could easily be
explained with connective weights.
Yet ACT strays from PDP as well.
As with previous models, Anderson
speaks of adding new propositions that
form links to existing ones through an
ever-growing array of extensions and
nodes. It is somewhat analogous to
building a structure on a table with
wooden blocks and dowels. Each new
proposition is represented by a wooden
block, which must be properly connected
with dowels to all other blocks it is
associated with. The task of making all
applicable connections with every new
block soon becomes formidable and is
restrained by the physical nature of the
structure. It would be much simpler to
have, say, a small box on that table with
an electric grid. Each new proposition
could be sent through the same grid as a
pattern of impulses, and the associations
and generalizations formed would be
implicit. Such is the orderly structure that
PDP imposes on the storage of
knowledge.
Another deviation from PDP in the
ACT model regards its use of rule-based
"production systems." PDP, while not
ruling out the use of rules in cognition,
prefers to search for explanations that do
not necessitate them. A PDP model
would never employ the use of production
rules as a starting point in constructing a
model, as this would tend to imply
executive functioning.
An interesting aspect of the
relationship between episodic and
semantic memory is brought up by Best
(1992) in his discussion of the ACT
theory. The discussion centers on the
"type" node for cats (general, semantic
memory) and the "token" nodes (specific,
episodic memory) that branch from it. He
states that in his own token nodes under
"cat" there would be the representation
"my cat recently scratched the sofa". He
proceeds to theorize that with a few more
observed examples of sofa-scratching by
cats this episodic fact could be generalized
and elevated to the level of semantic
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knowledge in the type nodes (things that
are true of all cats).
PDP would take a different
viewpoint on this, specifically in the need
for "a few more examples of sofascratching by cats". In PDP's view, one
single episode of sofa-scratching would
enter the weights relating to cats and
would tend to generalize, at least to some
degree. The result would be that a person
in this situation would judge sofascratching to be a trait of cats in general,
albeit with a degree of probability low
enough to spur the testing of this
hypothesis. This is because, in effect,
PDP's equivalent of "type" and "token"
nodes lie within the same set of weights.
In other words, each "cat" exemplar (and
the weights that represent it) lies within a
system of weights representing the overall
concept of a cat. Under this supposition,
if Best never again encountered any other
cat scratching a sofa, the weights in the
module representing "his cat" would be
adjusted to reflect that sofa-scratching was
unique to that one exemplar. More likely,
he would encounter a number of
subsequent examples pertaining to the
scratching of a sofa by a cat, each of
which would augment the weight
representing that in the overall cat pattern.
While PDP offers some enticing
explanations of some aspects of cognitive
functioning, it is obviously not universally
accepted. As stated before, it is a
considerable departure from conventional
thinking, and therefore must answer to a
wide range of questions that inevitably
arise from the field. Presented in the
following paragraphs is a sampling of
some such objections and concerns.
One of the objections deals with
the hidden units. These aforementioned
units reside in a layer between the input
and output units and transform the signals
between them in such a way as to greatly
increase the processing power of a PDP
model. While they may possibly be
physiologically equivalent to interneurons
in the mammalian nervous system, which
are neither sensory nor motor (Hanson &
Burr, 1990), some aspects of their
incorporation into models have been
questioned. Among these are the

concerns regarding how to determine the
number of hidden units that are to be
employed in a given model, and whether
this chosen number is based on any
neurological data. Furthermore, there is
some question about how the connective
weights are assigned to the hidden units,
with some suggesting the possibility of
post-hoc fit with the data. In summary,
one feeling is that "the number of hidden
units, their connectivity with other units,
[and] the weights...should be justified in
terms of explicit principles" (Haberlandt,
1990).
PDP's response to this is based on
the fact that it is still in its early stages and
that, due to considerable self-imposed
constraints on its structure, "there are no
obvious principles that will allow the
generic design of connectionist (PDP)
models at this point" (Hanson & Burr,
1990). Modeling systems that will
function acceptably under the given
constraints is the primary focus at this
time; perhaps specific rules governing the
many aspects of hidden units will emerge
with continued research.
Another objection concerns the
issue often discussed in PDP of learning
rules for behavior versus learning
behavior through repetition that only
appears to use rules. It has been argued
that taking away rule formation leaves a
substantial gap in human reasoning. In
other words, it is our ability to form and
utilize rules, rather than relying on the
"percentages" predicted by repetition, that
places humans above the lower animals on
the reasoning ladder. Knowing the rule
for obtaining B from A is vastly superior
to just knowing that B results from A
(Hendler, 1990). Levelt (1990) adds that
a human, if told by the phone company to
"add 2 to the end of every phone number
starting today," could apply that rule
easily without having to be retrained on
-every phone number in his memory, as a
PDP system would theoretically require.
Levelt goes on to criticize the
notion that learning in PDP networks is
"natural," i.e., closely resembling human
learning. He argues that models
constructed in PDP are limited and
specialized, thereby not allowing them to
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be compared to human cognition from a
psychological standpoint. One of his
chief criticisms concerns the overriding of
pre-existing knowledge when acquiring
new knowledge. A child learning
arithmetic, he maintains, can be taught
addition first and multiplication later,
without having to be retrained on the
former. The only way to achieve both
skills in a PDP model, he says, is to "train
up" the two operations simultaneously,
which does not correlate well with human
behavior.
PDP counters this line of thinking
on two related fronts, both dealing with
the limited abilities of constructed models
at the current time. First, regarding rule
usage, PDP maintains that a system
"adopts representations to perform one
task (as far as it knows) and if 'enough'
constraints are present the network can
apply the representation to new tasks"
(Hanson & Burr, 1990). This is a question
of "scaling," really; that is, the difficulties
in mapping to new tasks are based on
expanding the domain of the model, and
not on any inherent weakness in the
theory. Furthering this thought in a
natural extension to the second point, "one
must realize that when there is a
dissociation between technology and
theory, it is easy to make bad models"
(Hanson & Burr, 1990). Simply stated,
technological limitations need not damn
the underlying theory; transforming a
complex theory to hardware is a trial-anderror endeavor at times, and its current
lack of success should not be interpreted
as a failure of the theory itself.
PDP has been criticized by some,
especially those in the field of linguistics,
for conveying a system too close to
empiricism, or "blank slate" views on
mental development. Indeed, Hanson &
Burr (1990) downplay Chomsky's
Language Acquisition Device, stating that
any tendencies. a human is likely to- beborn with would more probably deal with
extreme generalities, such as the threedimensionality of the world, alternating
cycles of light and darkness, etc., and not
to "specific activities (such as chess
playing, tennis, or speaking English,
Shepard, 1987)." However, opponents of
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this argue in favor of something at least
akin to LAD, employing as evidence the
rapid rate with which we learn language
as compared to other, less complex tasks.
They argue that there must be some sort of
naturally-constrained, "prewired" learning
process to permit this (Jordan, 1990).
Such a mechanism does not fit well within
the framework and ideology of PDP.
Others question the value of PDP's
contribution to the field of psychology.
While hidden units may have a
neurological equivalent, the functioning
they allow may be inconsistent with
observed functioning in humans.
Lamberts and d'Ydewalle (1990), for
example, argue that if experimental
evidence implies the use of three
processing stages for a person to compute
a certain mapping, and if a PDP model
with hidden units is constructed to do it in
only two stages, then that model is simply
incorrect psychologically. Lamberts and
d'Ydewalle further contend that simply
because a model has "neural plausibility"
does not necessarily make it
psychologically relevant. That is, that a
model can accurately explain what the
brain could be doing within the constraints
of physiological knowledge cannot be
taken without question to mean that this is
what it actually is doing (an application of
the fact that a theory's successful
explanation of something does not
guarantee the correctness of that theory).
Again, PDP is forced to stand
behind its early stage of development in
answer to this, implying that it is perhaps
not yet "time to map these models into
specific theories of cognition" (Hanson &
Burr, 1990). Groundwork is being laid
and its success is encouraging, but PDP
admits that it is not yet a perfect match to
biology. However, given the restrictions
it places on itself in regard to neural
architecture, it seems the future
application of the beliefs to specific
cognitive theories is promising.
Some in the field of psychology
argue that all representations in a PDP
network are symbolic, basically being the
transformation of external stimuli to
excitatory or inhibitory impulses between
units, and that this type of representation
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is insufficient for interacting with the
world. Icons, they say, are necessary to
preserve the internal structure of the
stimuli that form them, to preserve
"similarity relations," and to allow for
generalization. Symbolic representations
are only arbitrarily related to the external
stimuli that form them, and can therefore
"neither preserve similarity relations nor
support generalization" (Phillips,
Hancock, and Smith, 1990).
This is countered somewhat by the
working example of the model discussed
earlier (that dealt with the recognition of
"dogs"), wherein (what is here referred to
as) a symbolic system was indeed
successful in "preserving similarity
relations," extracting a prototype, etc.
Churchland (1989) states that the brain is
"a purely physical system... short of
appealing to magic, or simply refusing to
confront the problem at all, we must
assume that some configuration of purely
physical elements is capable of grasping
and manipulating features, and by means
of purely physical principles." Neurons
compose the brain and are relatively
simple entities, their duties apparently
being merely the sending and receiving of
impulses.
Other objections focus on the
complexity of PDP, and the necessity of
searching for an irreducible element.
Suppes (1990) contends that the barriers
to understanding all the intricate details of
a highly complex process (such as human
cognition)
are
functionally
insurmountable, and the issue is better
studied at a higher, more general level.
The argument has also arisen regarding
our lack of knowledge about what is
happening within the model itself. Pavel
(1990) warns that "we must be wary of
modeling one complex system that we do
not understand (e.g., Homo sapiens) by
another (e.g., [PDP] networks)."
There are other objections -that
could be discussed, among them the
assertion that PDP is passive and therefore
not cognitive, that there is not enough
known about neurology to build models
that attempt to simulate the brain, etc., but
detailing all of them goes beyond the
scope of this paper. It should be noted,

though, that proponents of PDP have
plausible responses to a large number of
these objections, some of which have been
touched on in other sections of this paper.
Until PDP is further developed, there will
be remain some controversial points,
particularly on the philosophical front.
PDP is enduring well, given the
boldness of its assertions. Like a new
theory in any discipline that is a
considerable departure from the currently
accepted one, it has to constantly defend
itself; yet it has not seemed thus far to
have suffered quite so much of a
vehement and universal denial as other
frontier theories have. Perhaps this
reflects a new cautiousness in the
scientists of today in their propensity for
rejecting radical new ideas (some of
whom in psychology may still be
reminded of the complete paradigm shift
away from behaviorism), or perhaps it is a
result of its "naturalness." By this I mean
that there probably exist a significant
number of people in the field of cognition
that have felt some degree of discomfort
in accepting and referring to cognition as
an abstract process. The brain is
essentially the last organ to be understood
physically, and any progress on that front
tends to lend credibility to the field and
creates a firm foundation on which to
build, not one that may be swept away by
the next theory that arises. In other words,
many people are ripe for the study of
cognition from a physiologicallysupportable standpoint, as opposed to a
metaphorical one.
Furthermore, PDP may well allow
some previous theories back into at least
partial acceptability. Much of how it
accounts for various cognitive operations
dances dangerously close to behaviorism
(which it has, in fact, been accused of),
and its ideas about "settling" or "relaxing"
to solutions regarding schemata would
probably induce a smile from the
ostracized gestalt theorist. Perhaps PDP
has the ability to marry the past, present
and future into one collective viewpoint,
extracting the accepted strengths of past
theories and incorporating them into a
new weave.
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